Indeed, there is evidence that the threat was not ignored, at least not in certain selected respects. The San Francisco Chronicle reported one day after the attacks that Mayor Willie Brown received a phone call eight hours before the hijackings from what he described as his air security staff, warning him not to travel by air:

For Mayor Willie Brown, the first signs that something was amiss came late Monday when he got a call from what he described as his airport security—a full eight hours before yesterday’s string of terrorist attacks—advising him that Americans should be cautious about their air travel… Exactly where the call came from is a bit of a mystery. The mayor would say only that it came from ‘my security people at the airport.’”[116]

San Francisco Mayor Willie Brown was booked to fly from the Bay area to New York City on the morning of September 11.[117] Clearly, it seems that certain high-level U.S. security authorities anticipated some sort of grave danger, and believed it to be urgent, threatening and certainly real enough to inform a U.S. City Mayor about to catch a flight to New York—but not the general public.

The London Times reported that the famous novelist, Salman Rushdie, received a similar warning to avoid U.S. and Canadian airlines. According to Rushdie’s own testimony, the warning came directly from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The Times reports:

“The author Salman Rushdie believes that U.S. authorities knew of an imminent terrorist strike when they banned him from taking internal flights in Canada and the U.S. only a week before the attacks. On September 3 the Federal Aviation Authority made an emergency ruling to prevent Mr Rushdie from flying.”[118]

Another news report records that “the FAA has confirmed it stepped up security levels relating to Rushdie,” but “the airlines weren’t willing to upgrade their security” in relation to the wider public.[119] It is public knowledge that Rushdie is under 24-hour protection of UK Scotland Yard’s Special Branch, and that all his travel plans are approved by the MI5 for domestic travel within the UK, and by the MI6 for international travel. The MI5 and MI6 are the British equivalent of the American CIA. Clearly, it appears that British intelligence anticipated a grave danger, under the guidance of U.S. authorities, and believed it to be urgent, threatening and real enough to inform Rushdie—but once again not the general public.

Another report points to the Pentagon’s dubious role. Newsweek reported that on 10th September 2001, the day before the attacks, “a group of top Pentagon officials suddenly canceled travel plans for the next morning, apparently because of security concerns.”[120] An earlier report by Newsweek, published two days after the attacks, referred to the same event in more detail:

“… the state of alert had been high during the past two weeks, and a particularly urgent warning may have been received the night before the attacks, causing some top Pentagon brass to cancel a trip. Why that same information was not available to the 266 people who died aboard the four hijacked commercial aircraft may become a hot topic on the Hill.”[121]

Apparently, top Pentagon officials had known not only of an imminent threat to “security” in relation to their “travel plans,” but had even anticipated its exact timing and taken measures to protect themselves—but not the general public. Together, these reports strongly suggest that high levels of the U.S. military intelligence community knew something very significant—and took it seriously.

It is noteworthy that these reports also strongly suggest foreknowledge among high-level elements of the U.S. military intelligence community, that attacks would occur mid-September, and even more specifically on the 11th of that month. As WorldNetDaily editor and veteran American journalist Joseph Farah rightly observes:

“Now, you’re probably wondering why Willie Brown and Salman Rushdie [and senior Pentagon officials] are more important to the U.S. government than you and me and Barbara Olson. I’m wondering the same thing…

These selective warnings—and I have no doubt there were many more we have not yet heard about—suggest strongly that the FBI, CIA and other federal agencies had the information, knew something big was up, something that involved terrorist attacks on airliners, but failed to disclose the information to the airlines and the flying public in general. I think heads should roll at the FBI and CIA. I think there ought to be an investigation into what the FAA knew and when it knew it. I think, once again, the federal government has neglected its main responsibility under the Constitution—protecting the American people from attack.”[122]

The U.S. Intelligence Community

As early as 1995, the U.S. had information relating to the plans to launch air attacks on the World Trade Center—information that was repeatedly confirmed by the American intelligence community since then, all the way to the year 2001. Yet these agencies neglected almost entirely to do anything to prevent or prepare for these attacks as far as the general public was concerned.[123] Indeed, all such possible measures were cut short. Such was the case with the investigations by FBI agents confirming the impending 11th September terrorist attacks, whose leads were severed by the FBI command without explanation—a situation apparently maintained with the complicity of the Attorney General, a Presidential appointee. The U.S. government’s leading law enforcement agency thus deliberately ignored its own findings, and blocked these findings from being publicised.

We should particularly consider ECHELON’s warnings of a Project Bojinka-style attack by Al-Qaeda on U.S. soil, targeting “symbols of American culture,” first 6 months and then 3 months prior to September. According to the Newsbytes division of the Washington Post, “the warnings” that terrorists planned to hijack civilian airplanes and use them as bombs “were taken seriously” by “the American intelligence community”, as a consequence of which “surveillance intensified.” Furthermore, White House Counter-terrorism chief Richard A. Clarke confirms that the CIA fully anticipated an impending Al-Qaeda attack on U.S. soil in June 2001, and that the entire intelligence community was alerted by the beginning of July, just over six weeks prior to 11th September.

Warnings indicated that Project Bojinka would be implemented in the next several weeks. The World Trade Center was a confirmed target of Project Bojinka. The testimony of David Schippers confirms that knowledge that the impending attack would target key buildings in lower Manhattan, of which the World Trade Center is most prominent as a terrorist target, was fairly widespread among high-levels elements of the U.S. intelligence community. This seems to lead the chain of responsibility for the failure to act right to the top: the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).

The term “intelligence community” is a specific terminology coined by U.S. intelligence agencies to refer to all the 13 official government agencies that have an “intelligence” role. The Newsbytes report on the ECHELON warnings, apart from noting that the entire intelligence community was alerted to an impending Project Bojinka-style terrorist attack, also indicates that surveillance, i.e. intelligence gathering efforts, were increased in direct response to the ECHELON warnings. This means that U.S. intelligence agencies had adequate information with which to marry their specific findings, e.g. the FBI’s surveillance and investigations of Al-Qaeda operatives training at U.S. flight schools.

The official line has been that intelligence agencies had no reason to believe that these people with links to bin Laden were about to use their training to perform a terrorist act—but the documentation presented here shows that this is entirely false: the intelligence community already knew what Al-Qaeda was planning—it was just a matter of who and when.

Indeed, as a direct consequence of the intensification of surveillance, U.S. intelligence began finding out who. And as a direct consequence of the convergence of urgent warnings from multiple credible sources, including the interception of communications by Osama bin Laden himself, the probable date of the attacks also grew increasingly evident. Yet when FBI agents began finding out who (e.g. Al-Qaeda operatives training at U.S. military and flight facilities), the investigations were blocked by the FBI command and Justice Department. When multiple warnings together pointed clearly to the probability of an imminent attack by bin Laden, likely to occur on 11th September, these warnings were ignored.

The idea that the failure to act was a result of the incompetence resulting from unintentional bureaucratic stumbling blocks within the American intelligence community, fails to address the reality and nature of the multiple warnings received by that community. It is also based on a lack of understanding of the nature of intelligence gathering and the intelligence structure in the United States.

There are 13 official government agencies that constitute the U.S. intelligence community, with a huge budget of $30 billion. The Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law with the coordination and dissemination of intelligence gathered from all U.S. agencies, including the FBI. Additionally, many FBI agents work directly at CIA headquarters. The CIA, in line with its mandate for central managerial oversight of the U.S. intelligence community, produces ‘strategic level’ intelligence assessments for the U.S. government, drawing upon all available intelligence sources. A discussion follows of the nature and purpose of CIA strategic level intelligence assessments, regularly presented to leading members of the White House Cabinet.[124]

There is also a State Department Working Group set up to accomplish the same task in which the CIA participates.[125] A body of experts known as the Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) exists, which was effectively chaired by White House Counterterrorism chief Richard Clarke. The CSG constitutes a connecting point for all federal agencies, whose members are “drawn mainly from the C.I.A., the National Security Council, and the upper tiers of the Defense Department, the Justice Department, and the State Department,” and who meet “every week in the White House Situation Room.” The CSG assesses all reliable intelligence related to counterterrorism received by these agencies and departments.[126]

The regular intelligence assessments produced by the CIA for the top decision-makers of the U.S. government, which draw on all available intelligence sources, are known as ‘strategic level’ assessments. ‘Strategic level’ refers to the highest level of decision-making—at the national or alliance level. For example, during the Second World War, when Churchill and Roosevelt met to discuss their long-range plans, they were considering strategic level issues. ‘Strategic intelligence’ is thus designed to answer the category of questions that arise at the level of strategic decision-making: e.g. is country X about to turn hostile? If so, what would be their overall capability to attack?[127]

The threat of a large-scale terrorist attack orchestrated by operatives located in a particular country (in this case Afghanistan), and harboured/supported by the ruling regime of that country (in this case the Taliban), would certainly come under this “strategic” category. Such a threat, and its various dimensions and implications, should therefore have been passed directly to members of the White House Cabinet, including President Bush himself. According to established procedures by which the CIA keeps U.S. decision-makers informed, President Bush and other key members of his Cabinet would have received CIA intelligence assessments on the imminent Al-Qaeda operation.[128] This seems to lend significant weight to the conclusion that the CIA, the DCI, the State Department, the President, and key figures around him in the White House, were ultimately responsible for doing nothing in the face of the mounting evidence of an impending threat to U.S. national security.

Furthermore, since the ECHELON warnings were “taken seriously,” this means that the U.S. intelligence community should have been on alert and anticipating a Project Bojinka-style attack. The DCI would consequently have been doing its best to evaluate and coordinate information coming in from all sources to prevent the attack. Given that the U.S. intelligence community anticipated a Project Bojinka-style attack by Al-Qaeda operatives on U.S. soil, and had consequently intensified surveillance, all credible information and warnings that were subsequently collected were reviewed against this backdrop, with the specific intention of gathering further intelligence on bin Laden’s plans. This subsequent data, therefore, would have been understood in context with the plans of which the U.S. intelligence community had already become aware—six months and then three months prior to 11th September.

Thus, from both a statutory and an organisational standpoint, the argument of incompetence or bureaucratic blocking is extremely weak. Even to argue that elements of the Bush administration had significant knowledge of what would happen, but not enough detail to take measures to prevent the attacks, is based on a very shallow appraisal of the nature and number of intelligence warnings received. As evidenced on public records, these warnings were not only extremely detailed, but also extremely specific as to probable perpetrators, methods, targets, and dates.[129] As the Intelligence Note Book of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch Association clarifies in relation to methods of intelligence gathering:

“… one always wants to have as many different sources as possible confirming one’s intelligence assessment. When many different sources are combined in this way to produce one final assessment, this is known as ‘fused,’ ‘multi-source’ or even ‘all-source’ intelligence. Really, the sources used are a technicality, of more concern to the intelligence personnel producing the assessment than to the end-user. The end-users’ primary interest in the sources used will simply be to reflect how certain the conclusions are. The more different sources there are indicating a conclusion, the more certain we can be about that conclusion.”[130]

Indeed, the numerous warnings received and intercepted by the U.S. intelligence community in regard to 11th September certainly met the four established criteria of what constitutes an intelligence success in strategic warning. Robert K. Betts, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations,[131] refers to these criteria as follows:

“Intercepted information about the location and timing of attack was so rich as to make the deduction of warning obvious.

The event involved was truly vital to U.S. security rather than just one among many important problems, so leaders had no reason to avoid focusing on the warning.

There was no problem of estimating the enemy’s political intent to resort to force, as in pre-war crises.

There was nothing to be lost from prompt and vigorous military reaction to warning...”[132]

Hence, there cannot be any excuse within the U.S. intelligence community for ignoring or blocking further leads and subsequent warnings. When the ECHELON warnings were followed by warning after warning to the U.S. intelligence community from Israel, Russia, France, Egypt, along with numerous leads and warnings within the U.S. itself, according to the established procedures of intelligence gathering, the intelligence community should have grown increasingly certain of what was about to occur, by whom, and when. This is particularly clear given that the ECHELON warnings were taken seriously by the U.S. intelligence community—thus providing the backdrop of credibility against which subsequent reliable warnings could be assessed. Yet, we find that the very opposite happened.

Either pertinent CIA intelligence assessments were not passed on to the Cabinet, in violation of mandatory standard procedures, or they were, and the warnings were deliberately ignored by the nation’s top decision-makers. The former scenario is implausible, simply because it is contrary to established procedures. The CIA produces strategic level intelligence assessments, drawing on all sources in the U.S. intelligence community, which are presented to the President and other top decision-makers. These assessments are directly concerned with issues of national security. It is therefore reasonable to believe that the escalating threat to national security posed by Al-Qaeda was, in accordance with routine mandatory procedures, passed on to the President and select members of his Cabinet.

The only other alternative is that the procedures were violated. But, there is no good reason to believe this. If we arbitrarily conjecture that procedure was not followed, and the threat was not passed on to top-decision makers, then one would have to instead conclude that responsibility rests with significant high-level elements of the U.S. military intelligence community, who would bear responsibility for keeping top U.S. decision-makers in the dark. The question would then remain: why and for what purpose, if any, did they do so?

Arguably, there is no good reason to accept that this scenario is plausible. On the contrary, there is good reason to accept the probability that, considering their dire gravity, warnings on the impending Al-Qaeda operation did reach the top. According to mandatory procedures, the imminent threat to U.S. national security posed by Al-Qaeda should have been passed on to top decision-makers through CIA intelligence assessments.[133]

If established procedures were followed, as they should have been, and top decision-makers were informed, then the blame lies not only at the highest levels of the DCI, CIA, FBI, the Justice Department, the National Security Agency, and the State Department, but also with the White House Cabinet. According to these procedures, the relevant members of the Cabinet would have received notification of the warnings and subsequent developments in accordance with the CIA’s ‘strategic level’ assessment of the Al-Qaeda threat, as well as related relays of intelligence warnings. This is a more reasonable hypothesis, simply because it is in accordance with the known rules of intelligence warning in relation to issues of U.S. national security.

In the opinion of this author, therefore, the data provided here weighs strongly in favour of the conclusion that significant elements of the Bush administration did indeed receive advance warning of the attacks, but refused to act in the interests of the general public by pursuing measures to prevent the attacks.

Even at the minimal possible level of responsibility on the part of the Bush administration, the evidence on record strongly suggests that the U.S. government had enough advance warning to be at least certain of terrorist attacks on U.S. soil through the hijacking of civilian planes—but despite this, failed to institute even the most minimal of preventive measures.

For instance, the attacks could have been blocked even if the government had ensured that recommended security measures and precautions were pursued by the Federal Aviation Administration at airports, on planes, and so on. Yet the U.S. government, despite longstanding knowledge of the threat of impending suicide attacks from the air—a threat that was about to become a reality in 2001, according to highly credible intelligence warnings—did nothing of the sort.

Indeed, the facts on record are sufficient to provide reasonable grounds to believe that the ‘intelligence failure’ was in fact not a failure at all, but a directive—or rather, the inevitable culmination of carefully imposed high-level directives and blocks that restrained agencies from acting on the very clear intelligence received. Of course, a full-blown inquiry into the causes of the ‘intelligence failure’ that allowed the 11th September attacks to occur is essential to determine what U.S. government, military and intelligence agencies knew, when they knew it, and why they failed to act. Outside of such an inquiry, it is impossible to conclusively determine the exact degree of advance warning received by particular U.S. government, military and intelligence agencies.

Ongoing attempts by the Bush administration to actively block such an inquiry into the causes of the so-called 9-11 ‘intelligence failure,’ however, only serve to further support the conclusion just outlined. CNN reported at the end of January 2002 that:

“President Bush personally asked Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle Tuesday to limit the congressional investigation into the events of September 11, congressional and White House sources told CNN...

The request was made at a private meeting with congressional leaders Tuesday morning. Sources said Bush initiated the conversation… He asked that only the House and Senate intelligence committees look into the potential breakdowns among federal agencies that could have allowed the terrorist attacks to occur, rather than a broader inquiry that some lawmakers have proposed, the sources said. Tuesday’s discussion followed a rare call to Daschle from Vice President Dick Cheney last Friday to make the same request… Some Democrats, such as Sens. Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut and Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, have been calling for a broad inquiry looking at various federal government agencies beyond the intelligence community.”[134]

The pretext for the administration’s proposals, according to Daschle, is that “resources and personnel” would be taken “away from the war on terrorism,” in the event of a wider inquiry that is not limited to the assumption that the administration’s inaction was solely a consequence of “breakdowns among federal agencies.”

Paradoxically, the Bush administration thus justified blocking a wider inquiry into the intelligence failure that allowed the 11th September attacks to occur, by the need to support the administration’s attempts to counter terrorism. In other words, the administration suppressed an inquiry into the greatest terror attack in U.S. history—in the name of fighting terrorism.

It is unfortunate that CNN chose not to point out that an integral dimension of any meaningful counterterrorist programme is the gathering of intelligence with the view to avoiding a terrorist attack—which is exactly what Bush’s proposals will help prevent. Not only is it clear that the Bush administration was not serious about averting terrorism prior to 11th September, it also appears that the administration has maintained the same attitude—despite the obvious consequences.

The documentation collated here demonstrates beyond doubt that innocent American civilians paid with their lives because high-level elements of the Bush administration engineered blocks on U.S. intelligence agencies in order to fulfil and protect another agenda. Unless a full-blown independent inquiry into this process is mounted soon, there is little doubt that more innocent Americans will pay with their lives again.

Notes:

[1] Cited in Public Education Center, www.publicedcenter.org/faaterrorist.htm ; Washington Post, 2 January 2001.

[2] Warrick, Jo and Stephens, Joe, ‘Before Attack, U.S. Expected Different Hit, Chemical, Germ Agents Focus of Preparation,’ Washington Post, 2 October, 2001.

[3] Wald, Matthew, ‘Earlier Hijackings Offered Signals That Were Missed,’ New York Times, 3 October 2001.

[4] New York Times, 3 October 2001.

[5] Novak, Robert, Chicago Sun-Times, 27 September 2001.

[6] Agence France Press, ‘Western intelligence knew of Laden plan since 1995,’ 7 December 2001. Printed in Hindustan Times. [7] PEC Report, ‘Terrorist Plans to Use Planes as Weapons Dates to 1995: WTC bomber Yousef confessed to U.S. agents in 1995’ Public Education Center, Washington DC, www.publicedcenter.org/faaterrorist.htm .

[8] A dubious etymology. ‘Bojin’ means ‘to be afraid’ in Serbo-Croatian, and the suffix -ka is a diminutive. More likely it referred to an act done by or with Boeings.

[9] Garcia, Raphael M., ‘Decoding Bojinka,’ Newsbreak Weekly, 15 November 2001, Vol. 1, No. 43. Also see Cooley, John, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, American and International Terrorism, Pluto Press, London, 1999, p. 247.

[10] Geostrategy-Direct.Com, ‘1995 plan selected U.S.-bound airliners from East Asia,’ World Tribune, 19 September 2001, www.worldtribune.com/wta/Archive-2001/me_binladen_09_19.html . Also see Irvine, Reed, ‘Letting the Cat Out of the Bag,’ Human Events, 24 September 2001.

[11] Monk, Paul, ‘A Stunning Intelligence Failure,’ Australian Thinking Skills Institute, Melbourne, www.austhink.org/monk/index.htm .

[12] AIM Report No. 18, ‘Catastrophic Intelligence Failure,’ Accuracy In Media, Washington DC, 24 September 2001, www.aim.org/publications/aim_report/ 2001/18.html .

[13] Garcia, Raphael M., ‘Decoding Bojinka,’ op. cit.

[14] Washington Post, 24 September 2001. The Post also discusses Project Bojinka and the plans to hurl civilian jets into key U.S. buildings, including the WTC. Also see Ressa, Maria, ‘U.S. warned in 1995 of plot to hijack planes, attack buildings,’ CNN, 18 September 2001.

[15] Fineman, Mark and Pasternak, Judy, ‘Suicide Flights and Crop Dusters Considered Threats at ’96 Olympics,’ Los Angeles Times, 17 November 2001.

[16] Cited in Grigg, William Norman, ‘Could We Have Prevented the Attacks?’, The New American, 5 November 2001, Vol. 17, No. 23.

[17] Grigg, William Norman, ‘Could We Have Prevented the Attacks?’, op. cit.

[18] Stafford, Ned, ‘Newspaper: Echelon Gave Authorities Warning of Attacks,’ Newsbytes, 13 September 2001, www.newsbytes.com/news/01/170072.html. ECHELON is a vast intelligence information collection system capable of monitoring all the electronic communications in the world. It is operated by the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. While no government agency has ever confirmed or denied its existence, an EU committee that investigated ECHELON for more than a year confirmed that the system does exist in early September 2001. The EU committee reported that Echelon sucks up electronic transmissions “like a vacuum cleaner”, using keyword search techniques to sift through enormous amounts of data. The system covers the whole world’s electronic communications with 120 satellites. For more on ECHELON see Bamford, James, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency, Doubleday, 2001.

[19] Wright, Lawrence, ‘The Counter-Terrorist,’ New Yorker, 14 January 2002. Under pressure from Congress, the White House has finally officially admitted that the U.S. intelligence community had information that Al-Qaeda was planning an imminent attack through hijacking. However, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has gone on record denying that U.S. intelligence had any other specific information, such as that the planes might be used as missiles (BBC Newsnight, 16 May 2002). This denial, however, is patently false, as demonstrated by the reports on the public record discussed here.

[20] Solomon, John, ‘CIA Cited Risk Before Attack,’ Associated Press, 3 October 2001.

[21] United Press International (UPI), 13 February 2001. This report provides empirical information disproving an earlier WorldNetDaily report alleging that the Clinton administration sold powerful encryption software to Al-Qaeda that would allow the network to encrypt, and thus block U.S. surveillance of, the network’s encrypted communications. This report shows that regardless of Osama bin Laden’s attempts at encryption, the codes were broken by ECHELON and his communications monitored.

[22] New York Times, 14 October 2001.

[23] Associated Press, ‘World Trade Center collapses in terrorist attack,’ 11 September 2001. In an interview with ABC News the same day, Hatch elaborated that both CIA and FBI officials had informed him of the same. In response, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld denounced the report as an unauthorised release of classified information. The White House later cited the leak as good reason to withhold information concerning U.S. counterterrorist actions from Congress.

[24] ABC News, ‘Missed Opportunities,’ World News Tonight, 18-20 February 2001.

[25] The Record, 12 September 2001; Economic Reform, October 2001.

[26] Airjet Airline World News, Washington DC, 23 June 2001, http://airlinebiz.com/wire .

[27] Wright, Lawrence, ‘The Counter-Terrorist,’ op. cit.

[28] Stich, Rodney, The Real Unfriendly Skies, Diablo Western Press, Reno, Nevada, 2000. Also see www.unfriendlyskies.com .

[29] Pasternak, Judy, ‘FAA, Airlines Stalled Major Security Plans,’ Los Angeles Times, 6 October 2001.

[30] JW Press Release, ‘Government Incompetence, Lack of Honesty with American People Lead to Terrorist Disasters of September 11, 2001,’ Judicial Watch, Washington DC, 12 September 2001.

[31] Farah, Joseph, ‘The failure of government,’ WorldNetDaily Exclusive Commentary, 19 October 2001, www.wnd.com.

[32] Reuters, 13 September 2001.

[33] Star-Tribune, 29 December 2001.

[34] New York Times, 8 February 2002.

[35] Shenon, Philip, ‘FBI ignored attack warning: Flight instructor told agency of terror suspect’s plan,’ San Francisco Chronicle, 22 Dec. 2001.

[36] Seper, Jerry, ‘Justice Blocked FBI Warrant,’ Washington Times, 3 October 2001.

[37] ABC News, ‘Missed Opportunities,’ World News Tonight, 18-20 February 2001.

[38] Gordon, Greg, ‘FAA security took no action against Moussaoui,’ Corpus Christi Caller Times, 13 January 2002.

[39] Isikoff, Michael and Klaidman, Daniel, ‘Access Denied,’ MS-NBC, 1 October 2001.

[40] New York Times, 22 December 2001.

[41] ARD, 23 November 2001.

[42] Washington Post, 28 October 2001.

[43] Smith, Hedrick, ‘Inside The Terror Network: should we have spotted the conspiracy?’, PBS Frontline, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline .

[44] Swain, Diana, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 14 Sept. 2001.

[45] The Observer, 30 September 2001.

[46] BBC News, 26 November 2001.

[47] Capital Briefs, ‘Basic Failure,’ Human Events, 24 September 2001, Vol. 57, No. 35, p. 2.

[48] AIM Report No. 18, ‘Catastrophic Intelligence Failure,’ op. cit.

[49] Wheeler, Larry, ‘Pensacola NAS link faces more scrutiny,’ Pensacola News Journal, 17 September 2001.

[50] ‘Alleged Hijackers May Have Trained at U.S. Bases,’ Newsweek, 15 September 2001.

[51] Cited in Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Did terrorists train at U.S. military schools?’, Online Journal, 30 October 2001.

[52] Fainaru, Steve and Grimaldi, James V., ‘FBI Knew Terrorists Were Using Flight Schools,’ Washington Post, 23 September 2001.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Death in Venice (Florida),’ Online Journal, 28 September 2001.

[55] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘What are they hiding down in Venice, Florida?’, Online Journal, 9 October 2001.

[56] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Was the CIA running a terrorist flight school?’, Online Journal, 7 November 2001.

[57] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Jackson Stephens active in Venice, FL,’ Online Journal, 25 November 2001.

[58] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Rudi Dekkers and the Lone (nut) Cadre,’ Online Journal, 24 October 2001.

[59] Hopsicker, Daniel, ‘Venice, Florida, Flight School Linked to CIA: Firm has ‘green light’ from local DEA,’ Online Journal, 2 March 2002.

[60] ABC News, ‘Missed Opportunities,’ op. cit.

[61] Fainaru, Steve and Grimaldi, James V., ‘FBI Knew Terrorists Were Using Flight Schools,’ op. cit.

[62] BBC Newsnight, ‘Has someone been sitting on the FBI?’, 6 November 2001.

[63] Interview with Michael Springmann, ‘Dispatches,’ CBC Radio One, 16 Jan. 2002, http://radio.cbc.ca/programs/dispatches/audio/020116_springman.rm .

[64] Freedberg, Sydney P., ‘Loopholes leave U.S. borders vulnerable,’ St. Petersburg Times, 25 November 2001.

[65] David P. Schippers served as Chief Counsel to the United States House of Representatives managers for the impeachment trial of President Bill Clinton in the U.S. Senate from 1st Jan. to 28th Feb. 1999. He served as Chief Investigative Counsel for the United States House of Representatives’ Committee on the Judiciary during 1998. From April to September he handled the investigative issues and investigations relating to the committee’s oversight investigation of the U.S. Dept. of Justice and all of its sub-agencies. From Sept. to Dec. 1998, he was charged with reviewing and reporting on the Referral of the Office of Independent Counsel concerning possible impeachment offenses committed by President Clinton. He was then responsible for conducting the impeachment inquiry authorised by the House of Representatives and reporting the results to the Committee on the Judiciary. An attorney in private practice since 1967, Schippers is the senior partner in the Chicago law firm, Schippers & Bailey, which specialises in trust law, labour law, trials and appeals in the state and federal courts of Illinois and throughout the country. From 1963 to 1967, Schippers served as a member and later the chief of the Organised Crime and Racketeering Section of the U.S. Department of Justice at Chicago. He prepared and tried many major criminal cases in the federal courts and was also involved in a great number of major grand jury investigations. He previously served in the U.S. Attorney’s Office as an assistant United States attorney, trying major criminal cases on behalf of the government and preparing and arguing appeals on behalf of the government. Schippers earned both his undergraduate and J.D. degree from Loyola University in Chicago. He has served as a teacher of trial advocacy and advanced trial advocacy to senior law students at the Loyola University School of Law. He has also taught trial advocacy at the Williamette University School of Law in Salem, Oregon., and at the United States Air Force Air University in Montgomery, Alabama. Schippers served as one of five members of the Illinois State Police Merit Board from 1987 to 1993. He is the recipient of the Loyola University Law Alumni Medal of Excellence, the Loyola University Alumni Association citation for distinguished service to the legal profession and the Award of Appreciation from the Federal Criminal Investigators Association.

[66] Jasper, William F., ‘OKC Bombing: Precursor to 9-11?’, New American, 28 January 2002, Vol. 18, No. 2.

[67] David P. Schippers, ‘Government Had Prior Knowledge,’ Interview on Alex Jones Show, Talk Radio, Austin, Texas, 10 Oct. 2001, transcript available at www.infowars.com/transcript_schippers.html .

[68] David P. Schippers, ‘David Schippers Tells Metcalf Feds ignored warnings of WTC attacks,’ WorldNetDaily, 21 October 2001, http://wnd.com/news/ article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=25008 .

[69] David P. Schippers, ‘Government Had Prior Knowledge,’ op. cit.

[70] EFI Report, ‘What does nationally-renowned attorney David Schippers think of this possibility?’ Eagle Forum of Illinois, 30 September 2001, www.ileagles.net/schippers.htm .

[71] JW Press Release, ‘Active FBI Special Agent Files Complaint Concerning Obstructed FBI Anti-Terrorist Investigations,’ Judicial Watch, Washington DC, 14 November 2001. Also see ‘David Schippers Goes Public: The FBI was warned,’ Indianapolis Star, 13 October 2001.

[72] Telephone interview with Chief Investigative Counsel David P. Schippers by Nafeez M. Ahmed, Institute for Policy Research & Development, Brighton, 26 February 2002.

[73] Grigg, William Norman, ‘Did We Know What Was Coming?’, The New American, Vol. 18, No. 5, 11 March 2002, http://www.thenewamerican.com/tna/2002/03-11-2002/vo18no05_didweknow.htm .

[74] Palast, Gregory and Pallister, David, ‘FBI claims Bin Laden inquiry was frustrated,’ The Guardian, 7 November 2001. For further discussion see Chapter VI.

[75] Bruce, Ian, ‘FBI “super flying squad” to combat terror’, The Herald, 16 May 2002.

[76] Isikoff, Michael, Newsweek, 20 May 2002. See Ruppert, Michael C., ‘The Lie Won’t Stand’, From The Wilderness Publications, 16 May 2002.

[77] Editorial, ‘Evidence mounts that September 11 was predictable,’ USA Today, 15 September 2001.

[78] Wastell, David and Jacobson, Philip, ‘Israeli security issued warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks,’ The Telegraph, 16 September 2001. It has been claimed that the U.S. intelligence community receives numerous warnings such as this which are red-herrings, thus explaining why the latest warning from Israeli intelligence was not taken seriously. This argument fails, however, in light of the fact that the U.S. already knew for certain that Osama Bin Laden was planning to implement Project Bojinka very soon. Given this knowledge, the urgent warnings from other intelligence agencies, including Israel, would have obviously provided increasing confirmation of the plans, not disconfirmation. If not, then one wonders what other sort of criteria would be necessary for U.S. intelligence to take a warning from Mossad seriously!

[79] MS-NBC, 15 September 2001.

[80] Russian press reports translated by a former CIA official, cited in Ruppert, Michael C., ‘This Was Not An Intelligence Failure,’ From The Wilderness Publications, 24 September 2001. See Izvestia, 12 September 2002.

[81] Le Figaro, 31 October 2001.

[82] Gumbel, Andrew, ‘Bush did not heed several warnings of attack,’ The Independent, 17September 2001.

[83] San Francisco Chronicle, 14 September 2001.

[84] Ananova, ‘German police confirm Iranian deportee phoned warnings,’ 14 September 2001.

[85] MS-NBC, 16 September 2001.

[86] Associated Press, ‘Egypt Leader Says He Warned America,’ 7 December 2001. Also see Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 8 Dec. 2001.

[87] Nicolson was formally the David Bruton Jr. Chair in Cancer Research and Professor at the University of Texas M. D. Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, and Professor of Internal Medicine and Professor of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine at the University of Texas Medical School at Houston. He was also Adjunct Professor of Comparative Medicine at Texas A & M University. Among the most cited scientists in the world, having published over 480 medical and scientific papers, edited 13 books, served on the Editorial Boards of 12 medical and scientific journals and currently serving as Editor of two (Clinical & Experimental Metastasis and the Journal of Cellular Biochemistry), Professor Nicolson has active peer-reviewed research grants from the U.S. Army, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of Health, American Cancer Society and the National Foundation for Cancer Research. In 1998 he received the Stephen Paget Award from the Cancer Metastasis Research Society and the Albert Schweitzer Award in Lisbon, Portugal.

[88] Statement by Professor Garth L. Nicolson to the Institute for Policy Research & Development, 3 January 2002.

[89] Bonner, Raymond and Tagliabue, John, ‘Eavesdropping, U.S. Allies See New Terror Attack,’ New York Times, 21 October 2001.

[90] Ruppe, David, ‘Who Did It? U.S. Searches for Terror Clues,’ ABC News, 11 September 2001.

[91] AFP, ‘Similar plot first uncovered in Philippines, says police chief,’ Sydney Morning Herald, 13 September 2001.

[92] Newsweek, 1 October 2001.

[93] NBC News, 4 October 2001.

[94] San Francisco Chronicle, 29 September 2001.

[95] ‘Black Tuesday: The World’s Largest Insider Trading Scam?’, Herzliya International Policy Institute for Counter-terrorism, 21 September 2001.

[96] Eichenwald, Kurt, et al, ‘Doubt Intensifies That Advance Knowledge of Attacks Was Used for Profit,’ New York Times, 28 September 2001.

[97] Doran, James, ‘Millions of shares sold before disaster,’ The Times, 18 September 2001.

[98] Ruppert, Michael C., ‘Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks,’ op. cit. The CIA has also confirmed its use of Promis software outside the United States, while not denying its monitoring of stock option trading activity from abroad. For further discussion see Flocco, Tom, ‘Profits of Death—Insider Trading and 9-11,’ FTW Publications, 6 December 2001: “In a returned phone call from the Central Intelligence Agency, press spokesman Tom Crispell denied that the CIA was monitoring ‘real-time,’ pre-September 11, stock option trading activity within United States borders using such software as the Prosecutor‘s Management Information System (PROMIS). ‘That would be illegal. We only operate outside the United States,’ the intelligence official said…” [emphasis added]

[99] UPI, 13 February 2001.

[100] Doran, James, ‘Millions of shares sold before disaster,’ op. cit.

[101] Ruppert, Michael C., ‘A Timeline Surrounding September 11th,’ FTW Publications, 2 November 2001, www.copvcia.com/stories/nov_2001/lucy.html . For further information on Promis, the software descended from it, as well as the use of this new software by the CIA to monitor stock trading, see FTW Publications, 26 October 2001, www.copvcia.com/members/magic_carpet.html ; FTW Publications, Vol. IV, No.6, 18 September, 2001, www.copvcia.com/members/sept1801.html ; FTW Publications, Vol. 3, No 7, 30 September 2000, www.copvcia.com/stories/may_2001/052401_promis.html . Also see Washington Times, 15 June 2001; FOX News, 16 October 2001.

[102] Michael C. Ruppert, ‘Guns and Butter: The Economy Watch,’ Interview with Kellia Ramares and Bonnie Falkner, KPFA 94.1 FM, Berkeley, CA, 12 October 2001. Available online at ‘The CIA’s Wall Street Connections,’ Centre for Research on Globalisation, Montreal, 3 November 2001, http://globalresearch.ca/articles/RUP111A.html .

[103] Wall Street Journal, 2 October 2001.

[104] Hamilton, Walter, Los Angeles Times, 18 October 2001.

[105] FOX News, ‘EU searches for suspicious trading,’ 22 September 2001.

[106] Hooper, John, ‘Terror “made fortune for Bin Laden”,’ The Observer, 23 September 2001.

[107] USA Today, October 2001.

[108] Montreal Gazette, 19 September 2001.

[109] CBS, 60 Minutes, 19 September 2001.

[110] Pender, Kathleen, ‘Terrorism’s long, tangled money trail,’ San Francisco Chronicle, 7 October 2001.

[111] For discussion see for example Grey, Barry, ‘Suspicious trading points to advance knowledge by big investors of September 11 attacks,’ World Socialist Web Site, 5 October 2001.

[112] Ibid.

[113] The Independent, 10 October 2001, www.independent.co.uk/story.jsp? story=99402

[114] Ruppert, Michael C., ‘Suppressed Details of Criminal Insider Trading Lead Directly into the CIA’s Highest Ranks,’ From The Wilderness (FTW) Publications, 9 October 2001, http://copvcia.com . The discussion in this paper on financial transactions leading up to 11th September is based on Ruppert’s analysis. His comments on the CIA-Wall Street alliance are crucial, and have been reproduced here: “Clark Clifford – The National Security Act of 1947 was written by Clark Clifford, a Democratic Party powerhouse, former Secretary of Defense, and one-time advisor to President Harry Truman. In the 1980s, as Chairman of First American Bancshares, Clifford was instrumental in getting the corrupt CIA drug bank BCCI a license to operate on American shores. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and banker. John Foster and Allen Dulles – These two brothers ‘designed’ the CIA for Clifford. Both were active in intelligence operations during WW II. Allen Dulles was the U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland where he met frequently with Nazi leaders and looked after U.S. investments in Germany. John Foster went on to become Secretary of State under Dwight Eisenhower and Allen went on to serve as CIA Director under Eisenhower and was later fired by JFK. Their professions: partners in the most powerful – to this day – Wall Street law firm of Sullivan, Cromwell. Bill Casey – Ronald Reagan’s CIA Director and OSS veteran who served as chief wrangler during the Iran-Contra years was, under President Richard Nixon, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. His profession: Wall Street lawyer and stockbroker. David Doherty – The current Vice President of the New York Stock Exchange for enforcement is the retired General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency. George Herbert Walker Bush – President from 1989 to January 1993, also served as CIA Director for 13 months from 1976-7. He is now a paid consultant to the Carlyle Group, the 11th largest defense contractor in the nation, which also shares joint investments with the bin Laden family. A.B. ‘Buzzy’ Krongard – The current Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is the former Chairman of the investment bank A.B. Brown and former Vice Chairman of Banker’s Trust. John Deutch – This retired CIA Director from the Clinton Administration currently sits on the board at Citigroup, the nation’s second largest bank, which has been repeatedly and overtly involved in the documented laundering of drug money. This includes Citigroup’s 2001 purchase of a Mexican bank known to launder drug money, Banamex. Nora Slatkin – This retired CIA Executive Director also sits on Citibank’s board. Maurice ‘Hank’ Greenberg – The CEO of AIG insurance, manager of the third largest capital investment pool in the world, was floated as a possible CIA Director in 1995. FTW exposed Greenberg’s and AIG’s long connection to CIA drug trafficking and covert operations in a two-part series that was interrupted just prior to the attacks of September 11. AIG’s stock has bounced back remarkably well since the attacks. To read that story, please go to www.copvcia.com/stories/july_2001/ part_2.html.”

[115] Counterpunch, 14 September 2001.

[116] Matier, Philip, ‘Willie Brown got low-key early warning about air travel,’ San Francisco Chronicle, 12 September 2001.

[117] Cockburn, Alexander and St. Clair, Jeffrey, Counterpunch, 14 Sept. 2001.

[118] Doran, James, ‘Rushdie’s air ban,’ The Times, 27 September 2001.

[119] Ananova, ‘Rushdie “given U.S. air ban week before terrorist attacks”,’ 27 September 2001.

[120] Newsweek, 24 September 2001.

[121] Hirsh, Michael, ‘We’ve hit the targets,’ Newsweek, 13 Sept. 2001.

[122] Farah, Joseph, ‘The failure of government,’ op. cit.

[123] For instance, in spite of the multiple dire warnings, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to upgrade its security in accordance with repeated recommendations.

[124] CFIBA, ‘International Intelligence Agency Links,’ Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch, Association, www.intbranch.org/engl/elinks/us.html .

[125] Statement from Michael C. Ruppert, former LAPD narcotics detective and expert on CIA covert operations, to IPRD, 15 January 2001.

[126] Wright, Lawrence, ‘The Counter-terrorist Threat,’ op. cit.

[127] CFIBA, ‘Types of Intelligence,’ Intelligence Note Book, Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch Association, www.intbranch.org/engl/intntbk/intro.html .

[128] Ibid.

[129] Ibid. Any attempt to claim that intelligence received by the U.S. intelligence community was not sufficient must therefore somehow show that the facts on record, as documented here, are not facts at all.

[130] CFIBA, ‘Types of Intelligence,’ op. cit.

[131] Betts also served on the staff of the original Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and has been a consultant in the U.S. intelligence community.

[132] Betts, Richard K., ‘Intelligence Warning: Old Problems, New Agendas,’ Parameters (U.S. Army War College Quarterly), Spring 1998, p. 26-35.

[133] The implausibility of the idea that the CIA failed to pass on the warnings to President Bush Jr. and other top-decision makers in the White House through its regular strategic intelligence assessments, is further clear from the President’s strong links to the U.S. intelligence community through his father, former President Bush Sr., who was Director of the CIA. Indeed, the degree to which the current Bush Cabinet is drawn directly from the interlocking U.S. military, intelligence and corporate community, further demonstrates the implausibility of this scenario.

[134] CNN, ‘Bush asks Daschle to limit Sept. 11 probes,’ 29 January 2002. Also see Fineman, Howard, ‘The Battle Back Home,’ Newsweek, 4 February 2002. Fineman reports that Cheney called on Daschle “to pre-emptively protest public hearings by other committees.”

Mr. Nafeez Ahmed is a British political analyst and human rights activist based in London. He is Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development and a Researcher at the Islamic Human Rights Commission. This article is based partly on research in Ahmed’s new book on the U.S. role in the 9/11 attacks, The War on Freedom: How and Why America was Attacked, September 11, 2001.

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